Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them if they are perceived to have failed. To be publicly sacked as a failure is painful, often severely so, but the pain is finite. Agents thus have loss...

Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them. Agents thus have loss functions which are bounded above. We work with a bell loss function which has this property. With additive uncertainty the...

The recent crisis underlined that proper estimation of distress-dependence amongst banks in a global system is essential for financial stability assessment. We present a set of banking stability measures embedding banks’ linear (correlation) and nonlinear distress-dependence, and their changes...

This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003, 2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be...

We show, in an exchange economy with default, liquidity constraints and no aggregate uncertainty, that state prices in a complete markets general equilibrium are a function of the supply of liquidity by the Central Bank. Our model is derived along the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992). Two...

Our purpose in this paper is to produce a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour and risk-taking, to possible contagious interrelationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’...

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This is the first of three prospective papers examining how well forecasters can predict the future time path of short-term interest rates. Most prior work has been done using US data; in this exercise we use forecasts made for New Zealand (NZ) by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and those...

The regulation of bank capital in the form of capital adequacy requirements is itself inherently procyclical; it bites in downturns, but fails to restrain in booms. The more risk-sensitive the regulation, the greater the scope for pro-cyclicality to become a problem, particularly in view of the...