of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This … result can be seen as an extension of a result by Shapley for traditional cooperative games. Secondly, we show the core on …, we axiomatize the core by means of consistency, as is analogous to a result by Peleg for traditional cooperative games …

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …

appropriately applied. We regard global warming as a cooperative game and examine the conditions under which the core of the global …

of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This … result can be seen as an extension of a result by Shapley for traditional cooperative games. Secondly, we show the core on …, we axiomatize the core by means of consistency, as is analogous to a result by Peleg for traditional cooperative games …

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the …, one or several players with all their subordinates. In these situations, the core in its usual formulation may be … unbounded, making its use difficult in practice. We propose a new notion of core, called the restricted core, which imposes …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core … core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game … and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 …