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Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost...
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The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although it can also take place in...
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In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength...
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We present a dynamic model of noncontractual litigation in which the parties’ decision whether to litigate depends on information produced by courts and, vice versa, the courts’ involvement in the lawmaking process depends on the cases proposed by the parties. Thereby, we integrate in one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576966
We present a dynamic model of noncontractual litigation in which the parties' decision whether to litigate depends on information produced by courts and, vice versa, the courts' involvement in the lawmaking process depends on the cases proposed by the parties. Thereby, we integrate in one model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009142710
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005485618
In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1, the players’ effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A1 and r1, the value of A <Superscript> r </Superscript> decreases...</superscript>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010987972