[eng] Can central bank independence be counterproductive ? An open economy illustration.. . This paper shows that, in a static two-country game theoretic model, delegating the monetary policy to an « independent » central bank may be counter-productive. The decision to delegate or not must be...

It is often maintained that currency boards (CBs) and gold standards (GSs) are alike in that they are stringent monetary rules, the two basic features of which are high credibility of monetary authorities and the existence of automatic adjustment (non discretionary) mechanism. This article...

RESUME :Nous considérons l’activité de création de liquidité dans un système bancaire concurrentiel detype alternativement conventionnel ou islamique, en étendant le modèle de Diamond et Dybvig(1983) aux spécificités de la finance islamique :rémunération des dépôts non...

This paper examines the circumstances under which it is beneficial for small countries in a currency union to peg their currency to a large one (euro zone for example). For these purposes, we provide a three-country theoretical model extending the two-country model by Ricci (2008). The...