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We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255586
We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255815
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008164472
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states’ types (resolve) the chances of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161072
We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699651
Multiple-prize contests are important in various fields of economics ranging from rent seeking over labour economics, patent and R&D races to tendering for (governmental) projects. Hence it is crucial to understand the incentive effects of multiple prizes on effort investment. This survey...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662628
Under relative performance pay, other-regarding workers internalize the negative externality they impose on other workers. In one form -increased own effort reduces others' payoffs- this results in other-regarding individuals depressing efforts. In another form punishment reduces the payoff of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257464
We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713484
This paper considers the players' behaviour in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to "struggle" and when to "subjugate"? Analysing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for "struggle" or "war" have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986218
In einem Europa integrierter Güter- und Faktormärkte stehen die nationalen Systeme Sozialer Sicherung zunehmend auf dem Prüfstand. Mit der Schaffung des gemeinsamen Marktes wurden die individuellen Verfügungsrechte verändert. In diesem Essay werden diese Änderungen bezüglich den Zielen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986320