We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when...

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the play- ers are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and...

This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of Dutta (1995) [5] and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) [9]. To do this, the paper extends the concept of...

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when...

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and...

We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public†information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain...

This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers in <i>Advances in Behavioral Economics</i>. These papers show that there is a body of “behavioral facts†that is both economically significant and regular enough to be modeled. For the field to advance further,...

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural...