Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy, we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by...

Discrimination based on age can affect same-aged and intergenerational interactions, presenting socially and economically undesirable phenomena. To investigate the effects of age stereotypes on cooperation, we presented older adults (over age 50) and younger adults (under age 25) with belief...

Motivated by research reporting positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans, we examine price reactions to compensation contracting in experimental markets. The design allows us to manipulate variables separately and study issues of adverse selection (sorting)...

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

We examine subjects' behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects' beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...

We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively...

Accounting and finance researchers show semi-strong form efficiency or lack thereof by using sequences of prices from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat data for which there is no model of how these prices arise from individual decisions. One needs a setting in which...

We examine how analysts whose forecasts lag those of timely analysts aid the price discovery process. We classify analysts as lead and follower analysts for a given firm based on the relative timeliness of their earnings forecasts over a two-year period. We find that news in forecasts of lead...

We design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a...

We examine subjects’ behavior in sender-receiver games where there are gains from trade and alignment of interests in one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to examine the behavior of subjects in both roles, to...