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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008
corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered.  Higher negative externalities are also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004152
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Externality and framing effects in a bribery experiment
Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evience of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by a third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted.  And when the game is presented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004474
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Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis
Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008
Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not?  Do the social norms and values prevailing in the … undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country.  Among …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004448
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Cracking Down on Bribery
Banuri, Sheheryar; Eckel, Catherine - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
two countries with cultures that differ in corruption norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery: the US … that short-term crackdowns may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011118553
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Combining Top-down and Bottom-up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment
Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008
Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for … corruption, even when citizens' "voice" leads to formal punishment with a relatively low probability.  In contrast, pure top …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004232
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Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption
Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009
suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027124
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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Schmidt, Klaus - CESifo - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877662
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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210883
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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140961
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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083305