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The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development from Monarchy to Democracy
Huang, Fali - East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) - 2007
development path from monarchy to oligarchy and .nally to democracy with full surage. When it is too costly for any group of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009365197
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Consensual and Conflictual Democratization, Rule of Law, and Development
Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
conditional on beliefs about property rights enforcement. Democratization is endogenous, but the features of democracies are shown … to be crucially related to the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. Democratic transitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666567
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Consensual and Conflictual Democratization
Cervellati, Matteo; Fortunato, Piergiuseppe; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We study the process of endogenous democratization from inefficient oligarchic systems in an economy where … the conditions under which democratization initially takes place. The political regime and the extent of redistribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703836
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The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development from Monarchy to Democracy
Huang, Fali - School of Economics, Singapore Management University - 2007
development path from monarchy to oligarchy and ?finally to democracy with full suffrage. When it is too costly for any group of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005006760
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Improving Governance for the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals: Scenario Forecasting the Next 50years
Joshi, Devin K.; Hughes, Barry B.; Sisk, Timothy D. - In: World Development 70 (2015) C, pp. 286-302
Covering three fundamental governance transitions historically characteristic of modern states—the provision of security, the building of capacity, and the deepening of inclusion—we offer a pioneering forecast of the future of domestic governance through the year 2060 for 183 countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011209247
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Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem
Saran, Rene; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2011
stronger than Maskin monotonicity. We study three such processes: oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and random sampling …. Oligarchy collects only the opinions of the oligarchs (a strict subset of the individuals). We present a Nash implementable … social choice rule (SCR) that cannot be implemented by any oligarchy. Oligarchic democracy "almost always" collects the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851176
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Oligarchy versus Democracy and Regulation versus Deregulation under the Globalization Effect
BODISLAV, Dumitru-Alexandru - In: Theoretical and Applied Economics XVIII(2012) (2012) 5(570), pp. 33-46
asymmetric model that is called “oligarchy”(1). For a better understanding of oligarchy we consider an oligarchic society, where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004886
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Scanner of Our Capitalism (On the New Book by G. Tsagolov "Why Everything Is not the Way It Should Be")
A. Bunich. - In: VOPROSY ECONOMIKI 11 (2012)
According to the opinion of the author of the book, in present Russia is at a deadlock of beaurocratic-oligarchic capitalism. Sustainable economic development­ can be maintained only on the basis of social-democratic principles. Deliberate construction of convergent society is necessary that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011007700
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A Monarchical Perspective on Constitucional Governance: H.S.H. Price Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein and The State in the Third Millennium
Salter, Alexander William - In: Journal of Private Enterprise 30 (2015) Spring 2015, pp. 121-130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265849
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Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes
Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. - In: Spanish Economic Review 4 (2002) 2, pp. 151-158
Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371313