We investigate cost-sharing mechanisms for scheduling cost-sharing games. We assume that the demand is general—that is, each player can be allocated one of several levels of service. We show how to design mechanisms for these games that are weakly group strategyproof, approximately...

This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The...

We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In...

This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several...