This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from...

This paper addresses the question of whether the size of the legislature matters for the size of government. Previous empirical studies have found a positive relationship between the number of legislators and the size of government but it is questionable whether they have identified a causal...

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. Using panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, first we show that the timing and extent of privatization is affected by political fragmentation and proportional elections....

This paper develops a positive theory of how competition among political pressure groups shapes the organization of Congress and tests the theory using data on political action committees (PACs) in the financial services industries. For the Members of Congress, the first-best way to maximize PAC...

Socio-political uprising against land acquisition for industrial projects, in the recent times, has emerged as a major constraining factor leading to time lags, cost over runs, business uncertainties and even shelving of projects. Varied signals from recent (diverse) private experiences right...

Az új választási törvény egyik célja a korábbinál igazságosabb választási körzetek kialakítása. Ezt a Velencei Bizottság választási kódexében megfogalmazott ajánlásokhoz hasonló, bár azoknál némileg megengedőbb szabályok révén biztosítja. A szabályok rögzítik a...

Egy olyan kéziratot adunk most közre, amelynek anyagát Csontos László A KözépEurópai Egyetem Politikatudományi Tanszékén adta elő. Előadásában a szerző igyekezett a politika közgazdasági megközelítésének magyarázó erejét érzékeltetni, nem hallgatva el az ökonómiai...

This essay brings a synthesize of the doctoral thesis named «Essays in Political Economy: Evidence from Brazil», which provides relevant contribution towards our understanding regarding the incentives and constraints that local governments face in the context of a federalist system. The...

We exploit three natural experiments in Argentina in order to study the role of legislative malapportionment on the biased federal tax sharing scheme prevalent in the country. We do not find support to attribute it to legislative malapportionment during periods when democratic governments were...

The paper empirically analyzes whether electoral rules make legislators differently responsive to changes in fiscal incentives. Key to the analysis are two unique reforms in the German state of Lower Saxony which changed (i) the municipal charter by replacing the council-manager system...