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, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the … replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the …
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The study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs (Methods Oper. Res. 46:395–406, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1983</CitationRef>) and Driessen (OR Spectrum 7:19–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>). However, until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of...</citationref></citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010995384
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950100
One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755680
The goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two-person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure composed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759303
In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010995323
In this paper we consider a cost allocation problem arising in a consortium for urban solid wastes collection and disposal. A classical allocation rule is the proportional division according to the volume of wastes collected; here we propose a different allocation method, rooted in game theory,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010847711
The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883247