Cet article traite de l'effet des mécanismes de réponse de la demande sur l'efficacité des marchés de gros d'électricité. Dans le cadre des réformes de libéralisation des marchés de l'énergie, l'attention a initialement porté sur le seul coté offre du marché, supposant implicitement...

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential...

This paper experimentally investigates whether money illusion generates substantial nominal inertia. Building on the design of Fehr and Tyran (2001), we find no evidence that agents choose high nominal payoffs over high real payoffs. However, participants do select prices associated with high...

Our experiments refine and extend the work of Fehr and Tyran (2001), who suggest that money illusion can contribute significantly to nominal inertia in strategically complementary environments. By controlling for strategic uncertainty, visual focal points and cognitive load we find that...

This article presents results on the willingness-to-pay of French consumers for functional yogurt, using experimental economics. The impact of information regarding functional characteristics as well as the functional intensity of the products is measured in terms of participation to the market...

We present a series of laboratory experiments run in order to analyse cost-reduction innovation behaviour in competitive double auction markets. The experiments allow us to study both efficiency of markets in which the process of costs improvement is endogenous, and investment behaviours in R?D...