express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle must generate both of these paradoxes. Copyright …

candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of …

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts signi…cant turnout rates even when the electorate is … vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare …

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is … vote or not, an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare …

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority … strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain …

which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine … how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often … each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least …

Condorcet set: the set of logically consistent views which agree with the majority in as many issues as possible. Any element of … the issues are decided; this is called path dependence. We investigate the size and structure of the Condorcet set ---and …