becomes a more accurate signal of their ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may …

uncertainty and to smooth consumption across time : it also enables learning information. Conversely, defaulting now becomes … strategic : certain players may manipulate prices so as to provoke a default in order to prevent their opponents from learning …. We focus on learning equilibria, at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs -- not because those players with …

show that the success in learning the opponent’s type depends on the characteristics of the true game. The learning success … equilibrium and we observe no correlation between equilibrium play and learning about the game. …

uncertainty and to smooth consumption across time : it also enables learning information. Conversely, defaulting now becomes … strategic : certain players may manipulate prices so as to provoke a default in order to prevent their opponents from learning …. We focus on learning equilibria, at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs — not because those players with …

is not only a way to hedge oneself against uncertainty and to smooth consumption across time: It also enables learning … information. We focus on learning equilibria, at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs because they have taken time to …