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Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2011
black lies (increasing the supervisor’s earnings while decreasing the worker’s payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the … earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)’s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing … the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318147
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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2012
black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the … earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing … the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278326
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Ten possible experiments on communication and deception
Sobel, Joel - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 408-413
I describe ten situations in which experimental data may provide useful guidance to the study of cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C92, D8.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702951
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Dishonesty under scrutiny
Ven, Jeroen van de; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy’s (2005) deception game. We add a third … sender’s lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010942938
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The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information
Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2012
Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543595
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The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information
Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - HAL - 2012
Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899150
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Lies and biased evaluation: A real-effort experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 2, pp. 537-549
selfish black lies (that increase the supervisor's earnings at the detriment of the worker) and Pareto white lies (that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594586
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When do we lie?
Cappelen, Alexander W.; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 258-265
The paper reports from an experiment studying how the aversion to lying is affected by non-economic dimensions of the choice situation. Specifically, we study whether people are more or less likely to lie when the content of the lie is personal, when they base decisions on intuition, and when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048147
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Dishonesty under Scrutiny
van de Ven, Jeroen; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third … sender's lies to the receiver also do not affect lying behavior. Even more striking, senders whose identity is revealed to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011078393
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The Effects of Consumer Protection on Sales Signs, Consumer Search and Competition
Wilson, Chris - Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia - 2005
-order' monitoring can actually facilitate the deception of fully rational consumers, to deter them from otherwise optimal search …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968079