This paper presents comparative data on innovation in selected climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies in the context of Africa. Such analysis informs policy aimed at encouraging international technology transfer and development of domestic innovation capacities. We present...

This paper analyzes the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world economy comprising two regions, North (Annex I) and South...

This thesis consists of four self-contained papers, which are all related to important environmental and natural resource issues from a developing country perspective. Paper [I] concerns climate policy and addresses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from the North...

This paper analyzes the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world economy comprising two regions, North (Annex I) and South...

<Para ID="Par1">Recent Conferences of the UNFCCC Parties (COP) emphasized international technology funding as a means of achieving carbon emissions reductions in developing countries. Such funds are now being realized. Nonetheless, this paper is possibly the first theory-based discussion of international...</para>

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model that emphasizes the IPR enforcement effects on growth, in a scenario of north–south technological knowledge diffusion. The economy consists of three sectors, and firms are engaged in step-by-step innovation. In line with...

In the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue cooperative bargaining model. In contrast to the traditional Nash bargaining literature, the axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. We characterize a new solution that we call...

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are...

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies...