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Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210890
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604419
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598089
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817249
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140971
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084462
The paper analyses how cooperation in a repeated social game may help to sustain cooperation in a "linked" repeated production game. We show that this may happen a)because of available "social capital", defined as the slack of punishment power present in the social repeated game, b) because,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207203
The communication presents the partial results of a research proposing the social contract as a new instrument of analysis for the employment relation in a social context in change, such as the case of Rumania. Until then, the research which aimed at the employment relation which is formed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607292
We develop a model in which agents choose whether to achieve self-esteem through work. When they do, they develop an intrinsic motivtion to effort. Depending on the characteristics of the job to be filled, an employer may try, or not, to encourage this intrinsic motivation by an adequately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750469
A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094338