The n-person Battle of Sexes game is first introduced. The game’s properties are discussed and payoff functions are modeled under the main assumption that players’ payoffs are based on whether they like their choices or not and also on how many other players have the same choices. Linear...

A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the...

BSV (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny [Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998) 307–343]) model is one of the three major behavioral finance models. The existing BSV model is about how behavioral investors form beliefs, and is able to produce both overreaction and mean-reversion for a wide range...

The dynamics of a spatial formulation of the iterated battle of the sexes with probabilistic updating is assessed in this work. The game is played in the cellular automata manner, i.e., with local and synchronous interaction. The effect of memory of past encounters is also taken into account. It...

Monetary and Fiscal policies interact in many ways. Recently the stance of fiscal policy in a number of countries has raised concerns about the risks for the outcomes of monetary policy. This paper first shows that these concerns are justified since, under ambitious fiscal policy makers,...

В статье рассматривается игра n-лиц с выбором момента времени. В каждый момент времени игрок решает, сделать выстрел или нет. В терминах таких игр формулируются...

In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway...

everal new families of semivalues for weighted n-person transferable utility games are axiomatically constructed and discussed under increasing collections of axioms, where the weighted Shapley value arises as the resulting one member family. A more general approach to such weighted games...