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The n-person Battle of Sexes game is first introduced. The game’s properties are discussed and payoff functions are modeled under the main assumption that players’ payoffs are based on whether they like their choices or not and also on how many other players have the same choices. Linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588739
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005716910
of the social group too. Including such adaptation dynamics explicitly in our models would allow simulation of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977679
BSV (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny [Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998) 307–343]) model is one of the three major behavioral finance models. The existing BSV model is about how behavioral investors form beliefs, and is able to produce both overreaction and mean-reversion for a wide range...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005060116
A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789352
Monetary and Fiscal policies interact in many ways. Recently the stance of fiscal policy in a number of countries has raised concerns about the risks for the outcomes of monetary policy. This paper first shows that these concerns are justified since, under ambitious fiscal policy makers,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067413
The dynamics of a spatial formulation of the iterated battle of the sexes with probabilistic updating is assessed in this work. The game is played in the cellular automata manner, i.e., with local and synchronous interaction. The effect of memory of past encounters is also taken into account. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011059181
In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for competitors to attribute to their opposition the same level of rationality they attribute to themselves. Using a simple but interesting C^3 (command, control, and communication) problem for illustration, a method is proposed for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997740
Using the Lefschetz fixed point theorem, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem is established for a class of n-person games with possibly nonacyclic strategy sets. It is argued that the Lefschetz approach to fixed point theorems may ultimately prove to be particularly important in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997747
abstracted in Zentralblatt fur Mathematik, August 1985, p. 410 This article presents a generalization of the standard N-person game with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. In particular, strategies (complete contingency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997748