We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent .rm, who has private information about his own production costs, makes a non observable long run investment choice, along with a pricing decision observed by the entrant. The investment choice affects both post-entry competition and first...

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we exploit a quasi-experiment occurred in a large public university located in Southern Italy, to study whether the introduction of a selective admission test affects two indicators of students’ performances: dropout rate and grade point average...

We present a dynamic OLG model of educational signaling, inequality and mobility with missing credit markets. Agents are characterized by two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: ability and parental income, consistent with empirical evidence on returns to schooling. Both quantity and quality of...

The study is of short-run and long-run co-movements and convergence across 21 OECD real per capita outputs on a sample period spanning 1960 to 1992 using dynamic principal components analysis and coherence analysis. We reject the hypothesis of convergence, but find evidence for long-run growth...

We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers have incentives to evade taxes and to escape sanctions by bribing public officials in charge of tax collection. However, tax collectors may be monitored by second-level inspectors whose incentives to exert detection activity are...