We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where government in each country use quotas or taxes as a strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play : targeting domestic emission, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two...

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The...

This paper considers the impact of differences in endogenous technological change between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic interaction in environmental policies. First, we demonstrate that an environmentally lagging country's technology may continue to...

Consumers voluntarily pay significant price premiums to acquire unobservable environmental attributes in green markets. This paper considers the performance of eco-certification policy under circumstances where consumers cannot discern environmental attributes in goods, but are able to form...

Thispaper examines the performance of non-cooperative environmentalpolicy in the case of local consumption externalities. In a two-countrymodel with monopolistic competiton, governments simultaneouslyimpose environmental product standards. Stricter regulationsforce the industrial sector to shift...