This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a...

Management Science recently printed an exchange of views between Kadane and Larkey (Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. 28 113--120; Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Reply to Professor Harsanyi. Management Sci. 28 124.) and Harsanyi...

How do individual agents enact the institutions that govern collective behavior in a social situation? How do individuals come to share self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior, so that societal rules and constraints have an effect on individual choice? Conventional accounts, such...

This paper is a brief history of game theory with its main theme being the nature of the decision makers assumed in the various stages of its historical development. It demonstrates that changes in the "image of man" nourished the developments of what many believe to be progress in game theory....

Bioeconomics is a relatively young field that uses an expanded microeconomics to examine animal behavior, human behavior, and animal and human social institutions. A voluminous literature is rapidly accumulating. There are as yet no standard textbooks, but there are several excellent books...