We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the en- velope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non- differentiable valuations. Despite these obstacles, we obtain a characterization of in- centive compatibility based on the familiar...

We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...

We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect...

We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type), and a gain-loss valuation that depends on...

In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; lexicographic affine maximization....

Consider a social choice setting in which agents have quasilinear utilities over monetary transfers. A domain D of admissible valuation functions of an agent is called a revenue monotonicity domain if every 2-cycle monotone allocation rule is truthfully implementable (in dominant strategies) and...

A puzzling feature of conspicuous consumption, given its role in signaling wealth, is that it is not more conspicuous. For example, luxury handbags are often available in multiple variants that differ in logo visibility; in fact, subtly branded handbags are often more expensive than their loudly...