Given a family of linear budget sets, an allocation is equal opportunity equivalent (Thomson, 1994) if there exists a common budget set such that each agent is indi¤erent between the bundle that he gets and the best bundle he can obtain in the choice set. We first study therobustness properties...

We discuss a problem concerning Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin''s (1979) definition of a rich domain and a very well-known result they established for these domains: on rich domains, if a social choice function is implementable in Nash strategies, then it is truthfully implementable in dominant...

Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are...

The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1977</CitationRef>) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in...</citationref>

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peakedpreferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency,...

We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peakedpreferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency,...

It is commonly found that uncertainty helps discipline economic agents in strategic contexts. Using a stochastic variant of the Nash Demand Game, we show that the presence of uncertainty may have a dramatically opposite effect. Cautious (efficient) and dangerous (inefficient) equilibria may...