It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming.  We formally investigate these arguments.  Ambiguous incentive schemes...

In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form...

We develop a framework for understanding how lack of clarity in business press coverage of corporate social responsibility functions as a mediated and emergent form of strategic ambiguity. Many stakeholders expect CSR to exhibit clarity, consistency, and discursive closure. But stakeholders also...

Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of...

Corporate scandals across the globe have triggered a broad discussion on the role of business in society, its legitimacy, obligations and responsibilities. As a result, businesses and their leaders are increasingly held accountable for what they do by the society at large. In Australia, the...

The paper generalizes Kuhn's Theorem to extensive form games in which players condition their play on the realization of ambiguous randomization devices and use a maxmin decision rule to evaluate the consequences of their decisions. It proves that ambiguous behavioral and ambiguous mixed...