We consider the following model. First, two firms choose locations on a Hotelling line. Second, they play a repeated price-setting game, in which they may be able to collude. Transportation costs are quadratic. We show that if firms collude in the location stage, they choose locations that...

We consider a two-stage differentiated goods duopoly model with demand uncertainty linking firms' capital structure choice to their output market decisions. Using a numerical analysis, we study how the equilibrium of the model is affected by demand volatility and the substitutability between...

In the 16th century, foreign ships passing through the Sound had to pay ad valorem taxes, known as the Sound Dues. To give skippers an incentive to declare the true value of their cargo, the Danish Crown reserved the right to purchase it at the declared value. We show that this rule does not...

We argue in this paper that a more active market for corporate control may weaken the takeover threat. We show that an increase in the number of potential raiders tends to decrease the probability of a takeover. This in turn weakens managerial incentives. The lower managerial effort level that...

This paper presents a formal model of tunneling and propping in a pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling shareholders shifting resources from one firm to another in the same pyramid. Propping is tunneling that is done to save the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We compare...

This paper is concerned with investigating the role of accounting practices in radical change processes. The institutional framework has been taken as a starting point in investigating these processes. The research has been carried out at the Dutch Railways. This company was forced by the Dutch...