, strategy-proofness, and unanimity, with and without anonymity, are decomposable on non-dictatorial single-peaked voting domains. …Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two … mechanisms--such as ordinal strategy-proofness or individual rationality--using linear constraints. Using the theory of totally …

a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model …

“interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no …

We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are … if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. …

We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where preferences are … if the attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. …

<Para ID="Par1">We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice model where … attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 …

allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k …