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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014

paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186230

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014

investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780761

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2015

rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266604

The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1913-1946

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043015

Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - In: Economic Theory 20 (2002) 3, pp. 483-502

to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371155

Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal

Steven, Brams; Marc, Kilgour - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and (ii) men and women. In the case of the latter, it produces either one or two stable matches whereby no man and woman would prefer to be matched with each other rather than with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109567

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186244

Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges

Unver, M. Utku Ünver; Dur, Umut Mert - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2012

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196702

Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818647

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