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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014
investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780761
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014
paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988
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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014
paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186230
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2015
rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266604
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The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1913-1946
We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043015
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Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2002
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645112
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Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2002
We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645140
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Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2007
This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645206
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Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2004
A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645228
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A Theory of School-Choice Lotteries
Unver, M. Utku Ünver; Kesten, Onur - Department of Economics, Boston College - 2010
A new centralized mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools in district school-choice programs. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others, over the mechanisms it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507993