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Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; LARS-GUNNAR, Svensson - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014

paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium … restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186230

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Mechanism Design Approach

ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010894988

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2014

investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780761

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2015

rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266604

The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1913-1946

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043015

Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006

This paper considers a fair division problem with indivisible objects, like jobs, houses, positions, etc., and one divisible good (money). The individuals consume money and one object each. The class of fair allocation rules that are strategy-proof in the strong sense that no coalition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771064

Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419350

Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - In: Economic Theory 20 (2002) 3, pp. 483-502

to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371155

Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Money

Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Larsson, Bo - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2000

rationality leads to a fixed-price equilibrium with a well defined rationing method (Gale's top trading cycle procedure). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190590

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Ehlers, Lars - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2010

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008776032