This paper investigates strategic interactions between a private highway operator and a private transit operator who uses the same highway for its services. Heterogeneity of travellers is taken into account by considering a continuous distribution of values of time. Demand elasticity arises from...

This paper investigates strategic interactions between a private highway operator anda private transit operator who uses the same highway for its services. Heterogeneity oftravellers is taken into account by considering a continuous distribution of values of time.Demand elasticity arises from...

This paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261514000356"><I>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological</I></A> 64, 1-23.<P> This paper analyses optimal coarse tolling of congestion under heterogeneous preferences, and especially the welfare and distributional effects. With coarse tolling, the toll equals a fixed value...</p></i></a>

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

In densely-populated countries and in particular in large metropolitan areas, the presence of so much human activity causes all sorts of negative externalities, for example traffic noise disturbance. These externalities call for corrective measures by the government. Economists have developed a...

Various contributions to the recent literature on congestion pricing have demonstrated that when services at a congestible facility are provided by operators with market power, the case in point often being a few airlines jointly using a congested airport, optimal congestion pricing rules...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...