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This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168676
This paper analyzes the cost and incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence. In common … evidence is the only cost-and-incentive efficient standard of proof consistent with a negligence rule. <P> Cet article analyse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572493
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives for socially efficient behavior, e …. We show that fault-based liability is generally more effective than strict liability in harnessing social image concerns …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010687448
We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101073
This paper analyses whether liability insurance is socially desirable, under strict liability or under the negligence … rule, when the injurer?s behavior is imperfectly observable. Liability insurance is known to be socially beneficial under … the strict liability rule, even though it can reduce incentives to exercise due care in situations characterized by moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187126
I show that legal uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the legality of a specific action, has positive welfare effects. Legal uncertainty works as a screening device provided that the threshold of legality is uncertain. The uncertainty discourages controversial actions, while it encourages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106489
I examine the case where fulfillment of a contractual commitment is only imperfectly verifiable and ask whether the court should then tell the truth regarding the action in dispute. I show that truth seeking does not maximize the expected surplus from contractual relationships. From the parties'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823381
the negligence rule, when the injurer's behavior is imperfectly observable. Liability insurance is known to be socially … negligence when he was careless). I give sufficient con-ditions on the type I and type II errors for liability insurance to be … juridictions civilistes.<P> This paper analyses whether liability insurance is socially desirable, under strict liability or under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827155
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256628
We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the lawyer (effort at trial) that involves moral hazard. Clients incur a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008692911