We construct a general equilibrium model of two regions with cross-border pollution and capital mobility. To control pollution governments issue either intra-regionally or inter-regionally tradable emissions permits. We examine two issues. First, can the non-cooperative and cooperative...

We build a two regions general equilibrium model with cross-border pollution and either international or only inter-regional capital mobility. To control pollution each region uses public pollution abatement and issues either intra-regionally or inter-regionally tradable emission permits. We...

The environmental economics literature has ignored the effects of the interaction among capital mobility, private and public pollution abatement, and cross-border pollution on environmental policies. We analyze these effects in the context of a general equilibrium model. We find, among other...

This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two...

This paper concerns income and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdictional <p> framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction <p> is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world <p> market prices via public policy. In such a framework, a...</p></p></p>

This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market...

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four papers, which relate to environmental policy in the presence of transboundary environmental damage. Paper [I] concerns public policy in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. Each jurisdiction is assumed...

This paper characterizes income and commodity taxation as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash game in a two-country economy where one of the countries produces an environmentally clean good, while the other produces a dirty good. Among the results, it is shown that the commodity tax on the...

In this paper, we address two questions: (i) how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly, and (ii) how does trade liberalization affect this optimal tax system, and modify the economy's levels of pollution...