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The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82
strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in … the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion … is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667
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Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547366
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The political economy of trade liberalization in developing countries
Nabli, Mustapha - In: Open Economies Review 1 (1990) 2, pp. 111-145
The paper addresses the issue of trade liberalization in developing countries from a political economy perspective using the theory of collective action. The role of collective action and interest group behavior is analysed critically both with respect to the initiation of attemps at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714963
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Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence
Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi - School of Economics, University of East Anglia - 2009
We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571484
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Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity into Game Theoretic Models of Collective Action
Ahn, Toh-Kyeong; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M. - 2002
." Public Choice, 117, 2003, 295-315."Understanding cooperation in the context of social dilemma games is fundamental to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468400
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Adaptationist punishment in humans
Kurzban, Robert; DeScioli, Peter - In: Journal of Bioeconomics 15 (2013) 3, pp. 269-279
Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, George Williams, and Stephen J. Gould, among others, have pointed out that observing that a certain behavior causes a certain effect does not itself license the inference that the effect was the result of intent or design to bring about that effect....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989673
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The collective nature of export grouping schemes
Brito, Carlos; Silva, Susana Costa e - Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica … - 2011
both on their creation and development. Although cooperation has been recognized as a central feature, its collective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907163
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Social Capital in the creation of Human Capital and Economic Growth: A Productive Consumption Approach
Dinda, Soumyananda - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
reciprocity, which underpin cooperation and collective action for mutual benefits, and creates the base for economic prosperity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260984
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On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy
Bardsley, Nicholas - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200589
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Social Norms and Behavior in the Local Commons Through the Lens of Field Experiments
Cardenas, Juan-Camilo - Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes - 2009
Behavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550361