We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that if the type space is a multidimensional domain satisfying some ordinal restrictions, then an allocation rule is implementable in such a domain if and only if it...

Utility functions are regarded as elements of a linear space that is paired with a dual representation of choices to demonstrate the similarity between preference revelation and the duality of prices and quantities in revealed preference. With respect to preference revelation, quasilinear versus...

A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of...

We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those...

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The...

We compare the expected revenue in first- and second-price auctions with asymmetric bidders. We consider “close to uniform” distributions with identical supports and show that in the case of identical supports the expected revenue in second-price auctions may exceed that in first-price...

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....

The revenue equivalence theorem is an widely known result in Auction Theory. This note generalize that theorem for the case of Sequential Auctions. Our results show that under a class of Sequential Auction, if an symmetric and increasing equilibrium bidding strategy exists, then the revenue...

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities. That is, they offer payments that are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Standard auction mechanisms (such as first-price and second-price auctions) are not well defined unless...