We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle...

We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that if the type space is a multidimensional domain satisfying some ordinal restrictions, then an allocation rule is implementable in such a domain if and only if it...

A “law of scarcity” is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and approximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of...

We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those...

Utility functions are regarded as elements of a linear space that is paired with a dual representation of choices to demonstrate the similarity between preference revelation and the duality of prices and quantities in revealed preference. With respect to preference revelation, quasilinear versus...

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The...

Customers of network commodities face coordination problems due to adoption externalities that give rise to multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. We investigate the extent to which the coordination problem can be resolved by inducement schemes when agents' preferences are private information....

Abstract: This paper presents the outcome of a dynamic price-descending auction when the distribution of the private values is uncertain and bidders exhibit ambiguity aversion. In contrast to sealed-bid auctions, in open auctions the bidders get information about the other bidders' private...

We use a Tullock-type contest model to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically and revenue equivalent to each other. We consider a two-player contest, where outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival....