An explanation of how the Glass-Steagall Act, passed to prohibit U.S. commercial banks from engaging in investment banking activities, has led to the same costly cat-and-mouse game between banks and their regulators as did the prohibition against interstate banking, and an argument that...

I examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on the structure of executive pay. Specifically, I consider the increased board oversight implied by SOX, which is expected to weaken the pay-for-performance link under traditional agency models. Alternatively, if entrenched CEOs...

This paper uses matched employer-employee data for the Czech Republic to study the structure of managerial compensation. The evidence supports two key predictions from tournament theory. First, the managerial pay differential between organizational levels is non-decreasing as one goes up the...

This paper explores pyramidal firms and their motivations for the use of debt financing. We find that pyramids have significantly higher leverage than non-pyramids and that the use of debt in pyramids is associated with the risk of expropriation. We do not find evidence for the...

A large body of empirical literature investigates differences in financing structures across firms. Private firms’ financing receives little attention due to the lack of data. Using administrative confidential data on the universe of Canadian corporate firms, we compare financing relationships...

This paper examines the gender gaps in employment and wages among top- and lowerlevel managerial employees in a recent sample of Czech firms. Unlike the existing analyses of managerial gender pay gaps, we acknowledge the adverse consequences of the low and uneven representation of women for the...

I examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on the structure of executive pay. Specifically, I consider the increased board oversight implied by SOX, which is expected to weaken the pay-for-performance link under traditional agency models. Alternatively, if entrenched CEOs...

This paper uses matched employer-employee data for the Czech Republic to study the structure of managerial compensation. The evidence supports two key predictions from tournament theory. First, the managerial pay differential between organizational levels is non-decreasing as one goes up the...