Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...

The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show...

Barelli [P. Barelli, On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 144 (2009) 1320-1332] defines beliefs-determine-preferences (BDP) models and argues that BDP models are nongeneric in a topological sense. In this note, we point out some difficulties in...

We study a continuous-time reputation game between a large player and a population of small players in which the actions of the large player are imperfectly observable. We explore two versions of the game. In the complete information game, in which it is common knowledge that the large player is...

value greater than the Stackelberg payoff.