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The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs
Chen, Yi-Chun; Tillio, Alfredo Di; Faingold, Eduardo; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216
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A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
Chen, Yi-Chun - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 587-597
We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any … the normal-form concept of interim correlated rationalizability and we assume that players have no relevant knowledge of … rationalizability. We also strengthen the main selection result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by showing that the result holds for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820
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Coordination of Expectations: The Eductive Stability Viewpoint
Desgranges, Gabriel - In: Annual Review of Economics 6 (2014) 1, pp. 273-298
The eductive approach consists of finding solutions consistent with common knowledge of individual rationality and the model. An equilibrium is stable whenever it is the unique outcome consistent with these assumptions. This is a strong stability criterion as it relies on no assumption of prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004692
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The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games
Brandenburger, Adam - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Knowledge <i>(Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel)</i></li> <li>Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria <i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010976
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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Aumann, Robert; Brandenburger, Adam - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206381
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Admissibility in Games
Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda; Keisler, H. Jerome - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement — that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206393
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Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge
Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a single entity, called the player's type. This chapter provides an elementary construction, complementary to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206453
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Self-Admissible Sets
Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008])...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206587
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Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
Blume, Lawrence; Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
Two properties of preferences and representations for choice under uncertainty which play an important role in decision theory are: (i) admissibility, the requirement that weakly dominated actions should not be chosen; and (ii) the existence of well defined conditional probabilities, that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206642
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Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …
correlated rationalizability. It is shown that correlated rationalizability is equivalent to a posteriori equilibrium — a … theory is provided. An analogous equivalence result is proved between independent rationalizability, which is the appropriate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206697