For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …

In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with … commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage …

method used allows for arbitrarily many different types and provides an intuitive understanding of how "reputation" works. It …

The article presents a survey of theory concerning the "credibility" and "reputation" issues until the beginning of the …/her reputation for precommitment can sustain the ex ante optimal policy. Canzoneri introduces imperfect monitoring of monetary policy …

the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …

reputation in long-term relationships. …