External corporate financing typically involves contracts presenting a majority of the financial risks of the entrepreneurial activity on the entrepreneur. In academic literature, this one-sided risk allocation is usually justified by the informational advantages and unobservable actions of the...

We modify the payment rule of the standard divide the dollar (DD) game by introducing a second stage and thereby resolve the multiplicity problem and implement equal division of the dollar in equilibrium. In the standard DD game, if the sum of players’ demands is less than or equal to a...

Prior research has demonstrated that the ability to express one’s views or “voice” matters in social and economic interactions, but little is known of the mechanisms through which voice operates. Using an experimental approach based on the ultimatum game with the strategy method, we...

The rejection of unfair proposals in ultimatum games is often quoted as evidence of other-regarding preferences. In this paper we focus on those responders who accept any proposals, setting the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) at zero. While this behavior could result from the randomization...

In many experimental setups in social-sciences, psychology and economy the subjects are requested to accept or dispense monetary compensation which is usually given in discrete units. Using computer and mathematical modeling we show that in the framework of studying the dynamics of acceptance of...

Biological features and social preferences have been studied separately as factors influencing human strategic behaviour. We run two studies in order to explore the interplay between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social preferences may have some...

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

We investigate experimentally the modification of initial chances to acquire advantaged positions in bargaining problems. In the baseline case players have equal opportunities to acquire the advantaged position. Chances become increasingly unequal across three treatments. We find: (1) The more...

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The oer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy prole of a neutral third-party whose payos are independent from his decisions. If the oer is accepted the split takes...

We propose a dynamic three-strategy symmetric model of the Ultimatum Game with players using a sampling procedure. We allow an intermediate strategy, interpreted as a social norm, to evolve in time according to beliefs of players about an average offer. We show that a social norm converges to a...