For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This conuence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Rai¤a, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...

For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...

The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and allows for intermediate cases with some restrictions on...

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics,...

AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...

AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary

AbstractThe following sections are included:A Brief Digression on the Noncooperative Stage of a Biform GameBargaining Power Biform GamesBiform Games and ExternalitiesSome Examples from the Recent LiteratureBrandenburger and Stuart (2007)Chatain and Zemsky (2007)Biform Games and Job MatchingA...

AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions

AbstractThe following sections are included:Bargaining Power GamesExamplesThe Relation of this Model to Some PredecessorsMatching Games and Bargaining PowerBargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function FormReflectionsSummary