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Agency Revisited
Casadesus-Masanell, Casadesus-Masanell Ramón; Spulber, … - Fundación BBVA - 2007
complete description of the principal-agent relationship cannot be based on explicit incentives alone but must recognize … implicit incentives for trust behavior that derive from the legal, social and market context.These incentives reduce the need … to rely on explicit incentives, allowing the principal and agent to reduce transaction costs by using incomplete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008685255
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Combinatorial agency
Babaioff, Moshe; Feldman, Michal; Nisan, Noam; Winter, Eyal - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 3, pp. 999-1034
We study a combinatorial variant of the classical principal-agent model. In our setting a principal wishes to incentivize a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort on his behalf. Agentsʼ actions are hidden and the principal observes only the outcome of the team, which depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042925
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Is Leverage Effective in Increasing Performance Under Managerial Moral Hazard?
Calcagno, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000
We consider a model in which the principal-agent relation between inside shareholders and the management affects the firm value.We study the effect of financing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk-neutral shareholder (the principal) to implement the project-value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091167
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Vendor Certification and Appraisal: Implications for Supplier Quality
Hwang, Iny; Radhakrishnan, Suresh; Lixin (Nancy) Su - In: Management Science 52 (2006) 10, pp. 1472-1482
We examine the buyer's problem of inducing the supplier's quality effort using two arrangements: the appraisal regime and the certification regime. In the appraisal regime, the buyer inspects the units supplied and either charges a penalty for defective units identified during inspection or pays...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191985
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Vertragstheorie : Eine Einführung mit finanzökonomischen Beispielen und Anwendungen
Bannier, Christina E. - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004882732
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Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent Actions in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version
Bohren, J. Aislinn - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2011
intertemporal incentives in a setting where traditional channels fail, and can provide permanent non-trivial incentives in many …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938980
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Codes of Best Practice in competitive markets for managers
Alonso-Paulí, Eduard; Pérez-Castrillo, David - In: Economic Theory 49 (2012) 1, pp. 113-141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993596
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Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention
Belhaj, Mohamed; Klimenko, Nataliya - HAL - 2012
Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933829
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Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place
Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 3, pp. 347-370
We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers’ motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of a firm’s profit to charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959282
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Contracting with altruistic agents under moral hazard
AUBERT, Cecile - Econometric Society - 2004
In principal-agent settings with moral hazard, the fact that agents are altruistic vis-a-vis third parties (e.g. their family) modifies incentive costs. We derive sufficient conditions for the principal to benefit from altruism. They bear on how altruism affects the agent's marginal rate of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005342252