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Corporate governance when founders are directors
Li, Feng; Srinivasan, Suraj - In: Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011) 2, pp. 454-469
We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571671
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The Executive Turnover Risk Premium
Peters, Florian S.; Wagner, Alexander F. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely tobe dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, controlling for various other factors, unlikelyto be directly associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256296
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Does the independence of independent directors matter?
Crespí-Cladera, Rafel; Pascual-Fuster, Bartolomé - In: Journal of Corporate Finance 28 (2014) C, pp. 116-134
This paper analyzes the characteristics of firms that declare board directors as independents, although the directors are not strictly independent, and examines the consequences in terms of performance and corporate governance outcomes. Based on publicly available information, eight criteria of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011052894
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Stock repurchases and incentive compensation
Jolls, Christine - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004359318
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Does the Rolodex Matter? Corporate Elite's Small World and the Effectiveness of Boards of Directors
Nguyen, Bang Dang - In: Management Science 58 (2012) 2, pp. 236-252
This paper investigates the impact of social ties on the effectiveness of boards of directors. When the chief executive officer (CEO) and a number of directors belong to the same social networks, the CEO is less likely to be dismissed for poor performance. The results are robust to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990454
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Earnings management surrounding CEO turnover: evidence from Korea
Choi, Jong-Seo; Kwak, Young-Min; Choe, Chongwoo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This article examines the empirical relation between CEO turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 317 CEO turnovers and 634 non-turnover control firms during the period of 2001-2008. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of outgoing CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260003
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Are Forced Turnovers Good or Bad News?
Kind, Axel; Schläpfer, Yves - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2011
To gain insights  about  the  quality  of board’s  firing  decisions,  we investigate  abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand- collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009397223
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Does CEO turnover matter in China? Evidence from the stock market
Pessarossi, Pierre; Weill, Laurent - In: Journal of Economics and Business 70 (2013) C, pp. 27-42
We study the consequences of CEO turnover announcements on the stock prices of firms in China, where most listed firms remain majority-owned by the state. Our proposition is that state ownership may affect stock market reaction to CEO replacement because state-owned firms often pursue multiple,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730437