French firms laying off workers aged 50 and above have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. This is an original case of experience rating in the European context, restricted to older workers, whose employment prospects are particularly bad. We evaluate...

French firms laying off workers aged 50 and above have to pay a tax to the unemployment insurance system, known as the Delalande tax. This is a rare case of experience rating in the European context. We evaluate its impact on layoffs as well as on hiring, taking advantage of several changes in...

Alternative ways to organize government subsidies to unemployment insurance (UI) are analyzed in a right-to-manage model where industry-level unions run UI funds of their own. It is shown that equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in the share of UI financed by the employed union members. A...

This paper studies the role of labor market institutions in business cycle fluctuations. We develop a DSGE model with search and matching frictions and incorporate a US unemployment insurance experience rating system. Layoff taxes based on experience rating finance the cost of unemployment...

Vroman introduces a model-based approach to the study of UI financing. He creates simulations for several large states in order to examine a series of funding issues, and analyzes the performance of those state's systems. In addition, he presents the regional aspects of UI funding. Vroman...

Blaustein offers the definitive summary of the U.S. unemployment insurance system. This is the first of a two-volume update of Haber and Murray's "Unemployment Insurance in the American Economy."

The authors reexamine the experience rating provisions in the U.S. UI system and look at its effects on both temporary layoffs and long-term permanent layoffs. For temporary layoffs, they propose a higher degree of experience rating through a restructuring of the tax code while eliminating...

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. ln this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity....

When unemployment insurance is publicly provided, firms' layoff decisions can be distorted. Unemployment insurance reduces the cost of laying off workers, thereby encouraging layoffs and leading to more unemployment. To dampen this increase in unemployment, it has been suggested that...