We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuum of players. As application, we rationalize the active participation of politically engaged individuals as the unique essential equilibrium in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash...

We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum of players, where only a finite number of them are atomic. Given any set of generalized games continuously parameterized by a complete metric space, we analyze the robustness of equilibria to...

We develop a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial participation and price dependent financial constraints. In our model, equilibrium exists even when agents do not have access to all financial contracts. For instance, exclusive credit lines and investment clubs are compatible with...

We consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. Only atomic players are...