We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group … firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they …

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they … may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies …

preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and … induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate …

Bargaining games model situations in which the realization of potential benefits is jeopardized by conflicting … bargaining powers. Most of the literature on bargaining behavior focuses on bargaining over gains. Exploration of behavior in … is whether the negative effect of competing bargaining powers on the efficiency of agreements is more severe in …

as well as the ensuing bargaining. Theory predicts that link costs lead to less competitive networks, with one link … rather than two links, and that link costs do not affect the bargaining outcomes conditional on the network. We find support …