This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight...

A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability...

In warm glow models, an agent may prefer one alternative but aspire to choose another. The agent chooses her aspiration if she gets a sufficiently large warm glow payoff for acting as she aspires. This basic framework is widely used in models of turnout in elections and contributions to public...

When data is scarce, it is difficult to screen the opinions of informed and uninformed experts. In spite of this difficulty it is possible to deliver incentives for informed experts to honestly reveal their views, and for uninformed experts to do no harm to a principal in the sense that...

We consider a contracting problem between a principal who wants to be informed about relevant stochastic processes and an expert who claims to know which process will generate the data. The data generating process is known to belong to a given class.

We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However, instead of...