This article summarizes results of a study that investigates the signaling role of environmental policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm’s concealment of information from...

We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We find that, as the number of incumbents increases entry deterence can only be supported if the resource is abundant. Additionally, we show that...

This paper considers an entry-deterrence game in which environmental policy is set without perfectly observing the incumbent firm's costs. We investigate if regulators, who can have an informational advantage relative to the potential entrant, support entry-deterring practices. The paper...

We examine an entry-deterrence model with multiple incumbents who strategically increase their individual appropriation in order to prevent entry. We show that entry deterrence yields a welfare improvement, relative to contexts of unthreatened entry, if firms exploit a relatively scarce...

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to...

This paper examines firms? incentives to develop a new (green) product,which might compete against the traditional pollutant (brown) product that the? firm sells. We show that in equilibrium more than one?firm might develop the green good, but such an equilibrium outcome is not necessarily...

This article estimates the amenity value from climate change by analyzing the effect of climatic variables on house prices near ski resorts in different regions in the United States using a hedonic model. We find that higher average winter temperatures tend to increase house price near ski...

This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of...

This paper examines countries' free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (lEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and, second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' non-compliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country...