We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, `disciplines' governments and improves gov- ernance. We demonstrate that globalization a ects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital ight. This increased threat of capital ight can discipline governments and...

We use detailed contract level data on a portfolio of 197 co¤ee washing sta- tions in 18 countries to identify the sources and consequences of credit markets imperfections. Due to moral hazard, default rates increase following unanticipated increases in world co¤ee prices just before (but not...

This paper examines the role of cultural factors in driving the politics, size and nature (tempo- rary versus permanent migration) of migration policy. We show that there exists a broad political failure that results in ine¢ ciently high barriers restricting the import of temporary foreign...

We consider a model of policy choice in which appropriate policies depend on a country’s own circumstances, but the presence of a successful leader generates an informational externality and results in too little ‘policy experimentation’. Corrupt governments are reined in while honest...