Weighted network congestion games are a natural model for interactions involving finitely many non-identical users of network resources, such as road segments or communication links. However, in spite of their special form, these games are not fundamentally special: every finite game can be...

Equilibrium flow in a physical network with a large number of users (e.g., transportation, communication, and computer networks) may not be unique if the costs of the network elements are not the same for all uses. Such differences among users may arise if they are not equally affected by...

A group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes into account the different individual competences, and is...

In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is directed by correlated random messages received from an outside source, or mechanism. These messages allow for more equilibrium outcomes than without any messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...

The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other playersʼ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyoneʼs actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness,...

We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only do pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist but they are also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or best-response strategy. This weak acyclicity property is...

Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with the well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruism can actually make things worse for all people involved ? This paper tackles this question...