Can debt rescheduling decisions differ in multiple lenders’ versus a single lender loan? Do multiple lenders efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is disruptive so that a lender can rationally wait for the...

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the...

The theoretical aspects of three generation of financial crisis’ models are analyzed. On the basis of retrospective analysis of these models are determined the main causes than make the economic misbalance more profound and than cause a crisis. Проаналізовано теоретичні...

We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...

This paper develops a model of banking frictions and banking risk. As a sort of systemic risk, changes in banking risk lead to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. We decompose the macroeconomic effect of a banking risk shock into a pure default effect and a risk-aversion effect when...

We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by olipolistic ?rms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the ?rst stage they exert cost reducing e¤ort. In equilibrium the standard ?no distortion at the top? property disappears and two way distortions are...