Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentive schemes at work. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. Such a comparison is carried over by analysing how the two systems are able to...

This paper compares the ability to select the efficient policy of a parliamentary and a presidential constitutional setup. In order to do it we build a dynamic theoretical model with asymmetric information that succeeds in addressing both the politicians accountability and the competence...

This paper proposes a model to study the main factors that influence the preferences of different population groups between presidential and parliamentary systems. Our theory suggests that the parliamentary regime leads to a type of fiscal decentralization in the form of more transfers to...

This paper examines whether the current political arrangements framing the Mexican politics help in consolidating and advancing those economic reforms that have been implemented in Mexico since the 1982 severe economic crises. I will argue that these arrangements create impediments to the...

Following the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010, the Sri Lankan political system has seen the rise of a ‘one-party dominant state’ and a ‘hybrid regime’. This new political order consists of a mix of democratic and authoritarian elements largely seen in...

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian---as opposed to...

Non technical abstract: The recent empirical and theoretical literature on the political economy of development has investigated the impact of institutional quality mostly in terms of growth. Relatively less attention has been devoted to the distributional consequences of institutional...

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) Surplus governments; (5) Minority governments;...

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments;...